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Abstract
I argue that European schools of thought on memory and memo-
rization were critical in enabling the growth of the scientific method.
After giving a historical overview of the development of the memory
arts from ancient Greece through 17th century Europe, I describe how
the Baconian viewpoint on the scientific method was fundamentally
part of a culture and a broader dialogue that conceived of memoriza-
tion as a foundational methodology for structuring knowledge and for
developing symbolic means for representing scientific concepts. The
principal figures of this intense and rapidly evolving intellectual milieu
included some of the leading thinkers traditionally associated with the
scientific revolution; among others, Francis Bacon, Renes Descartes,
and Gottfried Leibniz. I close by examining the acceleration of math-
ematical thought in light of the art of memory and its role in 17th
century philosophy, and in particular, Leibniz’ project to develop a
universal calculus.
“What is the scientific method?” It is a question that rarely makes an
appearance in the scientific world. And perhaps for good reason. Most
scientific disciplines have advanced so far, that to the extent that there is
any “method” for students to learn, it is largely implicit knowledge that is
absorbed by actively problem solving and participating in the frontiers of
research.
∗The title is adapted from Chapter 10 of Frances Yates’ book The Art of Memory.
†Email:gsarma@alumni.stanford.edu
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According to the Oxford-English Dictionary, the scientific method is “a
method of procedure that has characterized natural science since the 17th
century, consisting in systematic observation, measurement, and experiment,
and the formulation, testing, and modification of hypotheses.”1 There is no
doubt that good science is characterized by the qualities encapsulated in the
above definition, and as I stated above, that these qualities are learnt im-
plicitly by participating in the scientific process under the guidance of more
experienced researchers. And yet, for an idea that is so simply stated, there
seems to be a profound sense of mystery surrounding the historical events
that allowed for the scientific method to take root at an institutional level.
What was it that took place in Europe during the 17th century that gave
rise to a cultural transformation so significant that it changed the face of not
only one area of systematic inquiry, but the entirety of the human pursuit of
knowledge? And how did a philosophical transformation of massive propor-
tions happen during this period and why did it not happen before? The world
had certainly seen systematic scientific reasoning and hypothesis-driven in-
vestigation prior to the 17th century. Empires had existed for thousands of
years, and the very operational foundation of these multi-national entities
would have required advanced knowledge to maintain such vast infrastruc-
ture. We can point to numerous examples of sophisticated understanding in
cosmology, medicine, or mathematics that are clear evidence of some form of
principled reasoning that existed prior to the 17th century.
And yet, it does seem that something profound happened during this time
period that deserves explanation. As modern intellectuals, we are surrounded
by numerous forms of print and electronic media that allow us to partic-
ipate in a philosophically reflectively culture that might shape our world
views gradually. We can read and re-read articles in newspapers, scientific
journals, books, and magazines, we can watch and re-watch lectures on the
Internet, and followup these periods of intense investigation with rapid elec-
tronic discussion with colleagues or anonymous commentators on blogs and
question answering sites. And to nurture “pre-scientific” or “meta-scientific”
knowledge, elite academic institutions have created exclusive departments
for philosophy and history of science.
1Scientific method [Def. 1]. (n.d.). Oxford English Dictionary Online. In Oxford
English Dictionary. Retrieved May 16, 2013, from http://www.oed.com.
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Almost none of these outlets and intellectual infrastructure existed in
the 17th century, and certainly not in the period leading up to it. What
then would have enabled a highly philosophical stance toward the pursuit of
knowledge, a “meta-idea,” to take root? Even in the modern world, philo-
sophically minded young people are chastened by their more worldly and
grounded peers to try to focus on concrete problems. Theoretical physicists
lament the towers of abstraction built by mathematicians and engineers often
hold a similarly derisive attitude towards their colleagues in physics. In a
world without all of these distinctions, what would have been the motivating
forces for adopting a philosophical and abstract perspective with regards to
the rational pursuit of knowledge, and not simply in the hands of a few bril-
liant visionaries but rather at an institutional and cultural level? Why did
these perspectives gain momentum and why had they not before? The pro-
foundly significant differences between our own world– even the recent world
prior to the Internet– and European intellectual climate several centuries ago
suggests that perhaps there were important factors that have been forgotten.
Why should we care to answer these questions? Other than the intrin-
sic historical value, there are perhaps more pressing contemporary concerns.
We live in an age in which the scope of science is larger than it has ever
been, in which more scientists are being trained than ever before, and in
which the tectonic plates of the scientific establishment are shifting, with
such headlining trends such as the massive, multi-institution, multi-national
“big science” projects, or the petabytes upon petabytes of data being pro-
duced which demand a global computational infrastructure unprecedented in
scope. In response to these trends, many commentators have argued that we
are entering a new phase of science entirely2 and some have even questioned
the role hypothesis driven investigation will continue to play in the era of
“big data.”3 There may or may not be lessons for us, but in such an era
of turbulence and upheaval, it seems worth re-examining how the scientific
revolution came about the first time around.
The position that I will advocate in this essay is that the scientific revolu-
tion was indeed a period of dramatic intellectual change and that in a sense,
2Michael Nielsen, Reinventing Discovery: The New Era of Networked Science, Prince-
ton 2011.
3Editorial, “Defining the scientific method,” Nature Methods 6, 237 2009.
3
what took place was a philosophical transformation. But it is for reasons
that I suspect most people will be wholly unfamiliar with. Drawing upon
the pioneering historical work of Frances Yates and Paolo Rossi, I will argue
the following:
• 17th century Europe was a cauldron of ideas related to the art of mem-
ory.
• These ideas have their origin in ancient Greece and Rome, where the
practice of memorization, using a visualization technique known as the
“method of places and images,” was a foundational methodology for
rhetoric.
• The classical art of memory was preserved through the Middle Ages
largely in the monastic context, with St. Thomas Aquinas being one of
the principle champions of the method of places and images. Aquinas
also introduced an important innovation by suggesting that these tech-
niques could be used not only for the purpose of memory, but also as
a concentration device for developing virtue and ethical behavior.
• During the Renaissance, a critical transition took place wherein the
mnemonic images of the classical art of memory were thought to not
only serve the purpose of remembering, but to also represent the logical
structure of nature itself.
• In the 16th century, Giulio Camillo, a major intellectual figure in the
Renaissance transformation of medieval memory, laid out an ambitious
program to systematize all knowledge with a theater sized repository
of standardized mnemonics.
• Somewhat independent of the classical art of memory, the 13th century
Franciscan friar Ramon Lull proposed an alternate conceptualization of
memory techniques in the context of combinatory wheels whose purpose
was to eliminate logical contradictions from Christian theology.
• At the arrival of the 17th century, there were several major schools of
thought on memory and method in place. The classical art of memory
involving the method of places and images, the method of Ramon Lull
and his combinatory wheels, and finally, the dialectic method of Petrus
Ramus, with its emphasis on a logical structuring of knowledge and
memorization by ordinary repetition.
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• In the late 16th century and 17th centuries, Giordano Bruno and
Gottfried Leibniz emerged as significant unifiers of these disparate
and often conflicting intellectual traditions. Bruno developed a hybrid
mnemonic-Lullian method in which the method of places and images
was used in conjunction with Lullian combinatory wheels, and Leibniz
developed a hybrid mnemonic-dialectic method in which an encyclope-
dia was first developed to which each concept would then be assigned
a corresponding mnemonic image.
• The fundamental concept in all of these developments is the general
notion of “method,” as first proposed by Petrus Ramus. The conno-
tation of “method” is likely analogous to our modern word algorithm,
and in the same way that the true meaning of algorithm only gains in
substance when used in the context of computing technology, the word
method gained its novel connotation in the context of the method of
places and images, Lullian combinatory wheels, and the subsequent
advances made by Bruno and Leibniz.
• It was amidst these developments in methodological dialogue that Ba-
con, Descartes, and others proposed the scientific method, a method
that aimed to simplify the various schools of memory, while preserv-
ing the core belief in a systematic approach to knowledge and secular
outlook.
• Without the broad nature of developments in methodological think-
ing, without the awe inspiring feats one could perform with the art of
memory, and the vision of all knowledge systematized in what we might
reasonably call a computational framework, whether in Camillo’s mem-
ory theater, or in Leibniz’s universal calculus, the scientific method is
unlikely to have taken root. The art of memory provided an essential
context and a vision of what would be possible with a systematic ap-
proach to knowledge. The scientific method is effectively a distillation
of the principles that were largely developed and made widely known
in the context of the art of memory.
This essay then is organized as follows. I first give an overview of the sev-
eral major periods of the ars memorativa, or art of memory, starting from the
Classical period in ancient Greece and Rome, and then progressing through
the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. The schools of thought that were in
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place by the end of the 16th century were the major conceptual battlegrounds
from which the scientific method emerged. I describe the major competing
schools of thought of this time and provide several modern analogies that may
help to shed some light into what the elite thinkers of this era were trying to
accomplish. I explain Petrus Ramus’ notion of “method” and how a perhaps
more proper characterization of the 17th century would be “methodological
revolution” rather than “scientific revolution.” I then return to the question
“what is the scientific method?” and describe how Bacon’s writings on the
scientific method were one of the later arrivals onto the scene of method-
ological discourse and that prior interest in the various schools of thought
on memory and method fundamentally enabled widespread adoption of the
Baconinan perspective. I will argue that what we have come to know as the
scientific method is simply a small remnant of a profound set of ideas con-
cerning the acquisition and development of knowledge, most of which have
been forgotten. Finally, I discuss Leibniz’ project for the universal calculus
and examine the acceleration of mathematical thought in light of 17th cen-
tury philosophy. So without further ado, let us turn our attention to ancient
Greence, where as legend has it, the art of memory was born.
The classical art of memory
An apocryphal story attributes the origin of the art of memory to the lyric
poet Simonides. While attending a banquet where he was to recite a poem
composed in the honor of a patron, Simonides is said to have been called
outside by the request of two visitors. While attending to the visitors, the
banquet hall collapsed, killing everyone. Unfortunately, the bodies and faces
were so mutilated that the remains could not be identified, which would pre-
clude family members from performing the proper funeral rites. However,
Simonides realized that the image of the banquet hall and those in atten-
dance was well preserved in his mind, and by walking around the table in
his mind’s eye, he was able to recall the name of each person at the table
and where they sat in relation to the others. Thus, he was able to identify
all of the remains so that the appropriate family members could be contacted.
From this experience, legend has it, Simonides concluded that the act
of memorization could be enhanced by encoding objects and concepts into
spatially organized visual images. As Cicero would later write of Simonides
in recounting the origin of the art of memory,
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He inferred that persons desiring to train this faculty must select places
and form mental images of the things they wish to remember and
store those images in the places, so that the order of the places will
preserve the order of the things, and the images of the things will
denote the things themselves, and we shall employ the places and
images respectively as a wax writing-tablet and the letters written on
it.4
He continues,
It has been sagaciously discerned by Simonides or else discovered by
some other person, that the most complete pictures are formed in our
minds of the things that have been conveyed to them and imprinted
on them by the senses, but that the keenest of all our senses is the
sense of sight, and that consequently perceptions received by the ears
or by reflexion can be most easily retained if they are also conveyed
to our minds by the mediation of the eyes.5
Where was this art form used? The primary domain of application was in
rhetoric. Indeed, the major sources we have about the ancient art of mem-
ory come not from ancient Greece, but rather, from ancient Rome, where
the method of places and images6 was carried on as part of the fundamental
training of students in rhetoric. The three latin sources that largely inform
our understanding of the ancient practice of this art are the ad Herrenium, a
Roman rhetoric textbook written by an anonymous teacher written around
86 BC, Cicero’s de Oratore, and Quintillian’s Institutio oratorio.
Practically, as the tradition was developed, the places that people would
use were often actual locations or important buildings and other architec-
tural creations– one wonders how many facts have been encoded into mental
images of the Parthenon, or later in ancient Rome, into mental images of the
Colosseum. Indeed, in our modern language, we see remnants of this fasci-
nating cognitive use of architecture. The phrase “in the first place” came into
common usage when it was understood that the person speaking was using
4Cicero, De oratore, II, lxxxvi, 351-354, quoted in Frances Yates, The Art of Memory,
London 1984, p. 3.
5Ibid, p. 4.
6I will use the phrases “method of places and images,” ars memorativa, and “method
of loci” more or less interchangeably in his essay.
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the method of places and images to encode the contents of a speech. Conse-
quently, the audience would have understood that the “first place” and the
“second place” and so on, represented actual physical locations in the mind’s
eye of the speaker.
Before moving on to later centuries and the evolution of the art of memory,
let me mention a critical distinction made in the rhetorical tradition, primar-
ily to illustrate the immense capacity for memorization via symbolic represen-
tation that these ancient orators would have developed using mnemonic tech-
niques. The ad Herrenium and other texts distinguish between the “memory
for things” and “memory for words”. The “memory for things” is the classic
art of memory I have described, whereby an idea, or concept of some kind is
represented using a striking image. In then delivering the speech, although
the order of topics is memorized, the precise words are delivered extempora-
neously and not memorized a priori. On the other hand, something that was
also prescribed as a technical practice, and not for practical purpose, was the
“memory for words” whereby a speech would be composed in its entirety and
then memorized using the method of places and images word for word. This
should truly astound a modern intellectual unfamiliar with these methods.
The fact that the memory for words was practiced at all, even purely for
the purpose of strengthening the raw mental muscles of the natural memory,
demonstrates what a phenomenal capacity these ancient rhetoricians must
have developed, not only for memory, but in developing their inner sight and
ability to visualize minute details with extraordinary clarity.
The art of memory during the Middle Ages and the Rennaissance
We see familiar prescriptions in a passage from the writings of Albertus
Magnus, a 13th century Dominican Friar,
Those wishing to reminisce (i.e. wishing to do something more spir-
itual and intellectual than merely to remember) withdraw from the
public light into obscure privacy: because in the public light the im-
ages of sensible things are scattered and their movement is confused.
In obscurity, however, they are unified and are moved in order. This
is why Tullius in the ars memorandi which he gives in the Second
Rhetoric prescribes that we should imagine and seek out dark places
having little light. And because reminiscence requires many images,
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not one, he prescribes that we should figure to ourselves through many
similitudes, and unite in figures, that which we wish to retain and re-
member. For example, if we should wish to record what is brought
against us in a law-suit, we should imagine some ram, with huge horns
and testicles, coming towards us in the darkness. The horns will bring
to memory our adversaries, and the testicles the dispositions of the
witness.7
The same places and images of antiquity! It is significant that during the
Middle Ages, it was mistakenly thought that the ad Herrenium was written
by Cicero, or as he was often referred to, Tullius. As I discussed above, Ci-
cero’s de Oratore is one of the few artifacts we have of the art of memory
during antiquity, but the ad Herrenium was in fact written by an anonymous
rhetoric teacher and not Tullius himself. Still, during the Middle Ages, both
works were taken together as the “First and Second Rhetorics of Tullius,” a
mistaken attribution which would ultimately come to lend substantial mo-
mentum to a fundamental Medieval transformation. The misattribution of
the ad Herrenium to Cicero proved to be critical, because in de Oratore,
he gives a great deal of attention to ethics and virtue as topical fodder for
speeches. And then in the “Second Rhetoric” he gave techniques for how
those topics would be properly memorized. This connection would ultimately
lead to the Medieval shift of the art of memory from being a rhetorical tech-
nique to an ethical one. In particular, it is Cicero’s inclusion of memory as
an integral part of the cardinal virtue of Prudence which proved vital to this
evolutionary trajectory of the art of memory.
We can see this transition latent in St. Thomas Aquinas’ four precepts
for memory:
Tullius (and another authority) says in his Rhetoric that memory is
not only perfected from nature but also has much of art and indus-
try; and there are four (points) through which man may profit for
remembering well
(1) The first of these is that he should assume some convenient simil-
itude of things which he wishes to remember; these should not be
too familiar, because we wonder more at unfamiliar things and
7Albertus Magnus, Opera omnia, ed. A. Borgnet, Paris, 1890, IX pp. 97, quoted in
Yates, p. 82.
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the soul is more strongly and vehemently held to them; whence
it is that we remember better things seen in childhood. It is
necessary in this way to invent similitudes and images because
simple and spiritual intentions slip easily from the soul unless
they are as it were linked to some corporeal similtudes, because
human cognition is stronger in regard to the sensibilia. Whence
the memorative (power) is placed in the sensitive part of the
soul.
(2) Secondly it is necessary that a man should place in a considered
order those (things) which he wishes to remember, so that from
one remembered (point) progress can easily be made to the next.
Whence the Philosopher8 says in the book De Memoria ‘some
men can be seen to remember from places. The cause of which
is that they pass rapidly from one (step) to the next.’
(3) Thirdly, it is necessary that a man should dwell with solicitude
on, and cleave with affection to, the things which he wishes to
remember; because what is strongly impressed on the soul slips
less easily away from it. Whence Tullius says in his Rhetoric
that ‘solicitude conserves complete figures of the simulacra.’
(4) Fourthly, it is necessary that we should meditate frequently on
what we wish to remember. Whence the Philosopher says in the
book De Memoria that ‘meditation preserves memory’ because,
as he says ‘custom is like nature. Thence those things which we
often think about we easily remember, proceeding from one to
another as though in a natural order.’9
We can take away a few points from Aquinas’ precepts. First of all, we
recognize, of course, as in the excerpt from Magnus, the familiar rules for
places and images. And yet, whereas Magnus gives a classical example (from
the ad Herrenium in fact) with the ram and its horns as a mnemonic image
for recalling the witness in a particular set of legal proceedings, we see in
Aquinas writing the impact of a medieval piety, and the notion that “spiri-
tual intentions,” rather than facts can be remembered and strengthened with
this practice.10
8These quotations are references to Aristotle.
9Quaestio XLIX , De singulis Prudentiae partibus: articulus I, Utrummemoria sit pars
Prudentiae quoted in Yates, p. 67.
10Of course, Magnus also hints at this idea in the preceding quotation: “Those wishing
to reminisce (i.e. wishing to do something more spiritual and intellectual than merely to
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There is much more to be said about Magnus and Aquinas, but having
made the basic point that the medieval practice of the mnemonic arts took
on a more spiritual rather than functional character, let me now to turn
to a completely separate strain of thought during the Middle Ages which
would come to feature quite significantly during the 17th century. This line
of thinking originated with Ramon Lull, a 13th century Franciscan friar, who
developed an art of memory that proceeded along very different lines than
the method of places and images, and which nevertheless had a great deal in
common with the Thomist objective of strengthening one’s spiritual capacity
and virtuosity.
Ramon Lull’s technique was distinctly evangelical in its purpose. The in-
tended hope was that by arranging the fundamental concepts of Christianity
on combinatory wheels, ultimately, one would be able to reduce the Christian
corpus to its logical essence, and thus convince non-believers of the funda-
mental truth of the Christian gospel.
Lull’s combinatory wheels consisted of concentric circles, each of which
was populated by symbols from the standard alphabet (see Figure 1). Each
symbol was used to represent a particular concept, for example, one set
of nine concepts used by Lull consisted of “Goodness, Greatness, Eternity,
Power, Wisdom, Will, Virtue, Truth, Glory.” Lull then created, or imagined,
concentric wheels with these concepts on each wheel, as denoted by specific
symbols or characters. The wheels move independently, so by turning each
wheel, in the mind’s eye of course, we arrive at a distinct set of concepts along
a given column. For example, if we have a setup with 3 concentric wheels,
we might imagine that in one particular arrangement, a given column repre-
sents the concepts, “Goodness, Will, and Eternity” and by turning the second
wheel by one notch we arrive at “Goodness, Virtue, Eternity.” It appears
as through Lull’s combinatory wheels served two purposes. They provided a
framework in which one was to structure core Christian values– presumably,
some amount of effort went into the specific choice of concepts and symbols–
and second, they provided a practical technique for a practitioner to first
enumerate and then focus on a particular grouping of concepts. What Lull’s
intent may have been in believing that this process would ultimately allow
remember) . . . ”
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LULLISM AS AN ART OF MEMORY 
to God in the four elements. Triangle says that he is nearer to the 
soul of man and to God the Trinity than are his brothers Circle 
and Square.14 
As already mentioned, the Art was to be used by the three 
powers of the soul, one of which is memory. How was the Art as 
memoria to be distinguished from the Art as intellectus or as 
voluntas. It is not easy to separate the operations of intellect, will, 
Fig. 6 Combinatory Figure. From Lull's Art brevis 
and memory in the Augustinian rational soul, for they are one, like 
the Trinity. Nor is it easy to distinguish these operations in the 
Lullian Art, for the same reason. In an allegory in his Book of 
Contemplation, Lull personifies the three powers of the soul as 
three noble and beautiful damsels standing on top of a high 
mountain, and describes their activities thus: 
The first remembers that which the second understands and the 
third wills; the second understands that which the first remembers 
and the third wills; the third wills that which the first remembers 
and the second understands.15 
14 Arbre de ciencia, in R. Lull, Obres essentials, Barcelona, 1957,1, p. 829 
(the Catalan version of this work is more accessible than the Latin one 
since it is published in Obres essentials); quoted in 'The Art of R.L.', 
pp. 150-1. 
15 Libri contemplations in Deum, in R. Lull, Opera omnia, Mainz, 
1721-42, X, p. 530. 
183 
Figure 1: Lullian combinatory wheel, from Art brevis.11
one to reduce Christian thought to its logical essentials and ultimately, to
free it of all logical contradictions, was that it provided a systematic method
for contemplating all possible groupings of different concepts from their re-
spective categories. Then over the course of extended contemplation and
discussion, one would engage in a long-term process of re-evaluating and
evolving the scriptural foundations. Lull’ mbinato y wheels provided a
systematic set of procedures to go about this ambitious process. Along the
way, it ensured that each combination would receive careful attention, and
hopefully, would draw attention to any possible inherent logical conflicts at
the basis of Christian thought.
What is remarkable about Lull’s revolving wheels, is how lacking they are
in any kind of aid to memory in any spatial or visual sense.12 Whereas the
11Yates, Fig. 6, p. 183. Reproduced with permission.
12Lull did develop another method which is more reminiscent of the classical art, in which
different branches of knowledge were to be organized on trees. Unlike the combinatory
wheels, these tree-like structures would have enabled the memory in a more direct way.
Still, I believe that Yates and Rossi are both correct in including Lull’s work in the lineage
of the ars memorativa. First of all, even though the combinatory wheels may not have
enabled the memory, it clearly prioritized memory in a significant manner– one way or
another, an aspiring practitioner would have to develop his or her memory substantially to
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classical tradition seems to provide its practitioner with a powerful tool to
boost the memory, Ramon Lull’s method seems to demand, from the outset,
an inner sight of penetrating clarity. As a simple exercise, I encourage the
reader to visualize nine letters arranged in a circle, and then try to imagine
rotating the positions of the letters one by one. It is not easy! Now imagine
that these letters are to be equally spaced on concentric circles, with each
letter representing a concept that must be remembered on its own. Only af-
ter holding all this information in one’s mind is the practitioner in a position
to begin to rotate the position of one of the wheels! If Ramon Lull alone had
the ability to perform this feat, it would be noteworthy. If, as the historical
record seems to indicate, there was an entire school of thought devoted to
his practice, it is truly a testament to the neural plasticity of the adult brain,
and its capacity to train new and unusual cognitive abilities with enormous
amounts practice and concentration. Unlike the classical art, the method of
Ramon Lull does not seem to take advantage of an innate capacity to remem-
ber places and images– rather it places a huge burden on our raw memory
and visual ability and aims to develop them both in a single-pointed fury of
devotion.
Yet another important transition took place in the philosophy and prac-
tice of the art of memory during the Rennaissance. Whereas mnemonics
had previously been thought of as being tools for remembering, and in some
cases, for instilling and intensifying religious devotion and developing certain
virtues, a new notion emerged during the Renaissance. In this new school of
thought, it was put forth that relationships between the objects of mnemonic
devices could perhaps be encoded into the relationships of the mnemonics
themselves, and thereby give rise to the ability to understand the natural
world by the strategic use of mnemonics.
put these techniques into use. If the goal was simply to enumerate all possible combinations
of a particular group of concepts, why not simply do so on slips of paper, parchment, or
cloth? It is clear that Lull believed that memory was essential to the long-term vision
of reducing Christian thought to its logical essence, a process that would be enabled by
having practitioners hold the different concepts in their mind in a focused, meditative
manner. But more importantly, in understanding the 17th century and the emergence of
the scientific method, Lull’s combinatory wheels would feature significantly in later efforts
that aimed to bridge competing schools of thought on memory.
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The most significant figure in this tradition was Giulio Camillo, a 16th
century philosopher and scholar, who devoted the majority of his life to a
project so fantastic and magnificent in scope that the entirety of Europe was
abuzz in excitement of the consequences. The project was to build a theater
sized repository of mnemonic figurines, physical statues which corresponded
to the classical method of places and images, but which would have been
standardized through great effort, and which would represent the near to-
tality of contemporary thought. Much of Camillo’s theater would have been
devoted to religious and astrological concepts. The theater, which was never
built, consisted of seven grades, or steps (representing the seven planets),
each of which was devoted to a particular branch of knowledge. The en-
trant, who would have been well versed and practiced in the classical art
of memory, would then be confronted with cabinets containing mnemonic
images representing some specific concept, fact, or idea. In addition, there
were numerous drawers which were filled with papers of speeches from Ci-
cero relating to the topical matters of the images depicted in the surrounding
areas. Viglius Zuichemus, a Dutch statesman, described the theater and his
meeting with Camillo in a letter to his contemporary, Erasmus:
The work is of wood, marked with many images, and full of little
boxes; there are various orders and grades in it. He gives a place to
each individual figure and ornament, and he showed me such a mass
of papers that, though I always heard that Cicero was the fountain of
richest eloquence, scarcely would I have thought that one author could
contain so much or that so many volumes could be pieced together out
of his writings. I wrote to you before the name of the author who is
called Julius Camillus. He stammers badly and speaks Latin with
difficulty, excusing himself with the pretext that through continually
using his pen he has nearly lost the use of speech. He is said however
to be good in the vernacular which he has taught at some time in
Bologna. When I asked him concerning the meaning of the work, its
plan and results– speaking religiously and as though stupefied by the
miraculousness of the thing– he threw before me some papers, and re-
cited them so that he expressed the numbers, clauses, and the artifices
of the Italian style, yet slightly unevenly because of the impediment
in his speech. The King is said to be urging that he should return
to France with the magnificent work. But since the King wished that
all the writing should be translated to French, for which he had tried
14
an interpreter and scribe, he said that he thought he would defer his
journey rather than exhibit an imperfect work. He calls this theater
of his by many names, saying now that it is a built or constructed
mind and soul, and now that it is a windowed one. He pretends that
all things that the human mind can conceive and which we cannot
see with the corporeal eye, after being collected together by diligent
meditation may be expressed by certain corporeal signs in such a way
that the beholder may at once perceive with his eyes everything that is
otherwise hidden in the depths of the human mind. And it is because
of this corporeal looking that he calls it a theater.13
Camillo’s theater represents a third and distinct phase of the art of mem-
ory. What began in antiquity as a functional practice for memorizing the
contents of speeches in the rhetorical tradition, then took on a spiritual
character during the Middle Ages in the hands of St. Thomas Aquinas and
the Dominican tradition. In a sense, Camillo’s mnemonic theater fuses the
classical art of memory with part of the intent of Ramon Lull’s quite distinct
practice of religious concepts encoded into combinatory wheels. Camillo’s
theater, while still in the tradition of the method of place and images, rep-
resents a vision of knowledge systematized to a heroic degree, not solely for
the purpose of memory, but for understanding the structure of knowledge
itself and for accurately reflecting the basic principles of the cosmos in its
mnemonic organization.
The 17th century and a conceptual reinvention
Entering the 17th century, we are confronted with the following raw materials
in the world of method and memorization. From ancient Greece and ancient
Rome, via the rhetorical tradition and through the work of Dominican order
comes the tradition of the ars memorativa and the systematic and creative
use of mnemonics for the purpose of memory, and in a closely related capac-
ity, for ethical development. On the other hand, from Ramon Lull, who we
recall as early as the 13th century was developing his own system of symbolic
representation of religious concepts, we have the notion of an intensive prac-
tice of memory, but without the associated system of images. From Giulio
Camillo, we have the Renaissance transformation of the classical art, with
its rules for images and places well preserved, but now with the additional
13Erasmus, Epistolae, ed. P. S. Allen et al., IX, pp. 29-30 quoted in Yates, p. 132.
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notion that mnemonic images could also be used to represent the structure
of knowledge and of Nature itself.
And of course, memory through “mere” repetition is an age old notion
that has no name to which we can attribute a founder, although it was more
precisely formulated by a man who is critical in understanding the 17th cen-
tury and the origin of the scientific method, Petrus Ramus. Ramus was a
16th century educational reformer who was particularly concerned with re-
examining the ways in which subjects were to be memorized. In particular,
Ramus made the dramatic, iconoclastic move of eliminating memory as part
of rhetoric. With this, he was able to distance himself from the mnemonic
practice of places and images, which he replaced with a new method, called
the “dialectic method.” In this method, a subject is first structured in a
logical manner by proceeding from the most general concepts to the most
specific. The content is then memorized by the standard practice of repeti-
tion.
Part of Ramus’ motivation as a reformer related to a specific set of re-
ligious objections to the classical art of memory which stem from the Old
Testament:
Take ye therefore good heed unto yourselves; for ye saw no manner
of similitude on the day that the Lord spoke unto you in Horeb out
of the midst of the fire: Lest ye corrupt yourselves, and make you
a graven image, the similitude of any figure the likeness of male or
female . . . And lest thou lift up thine eyes, unto heaven, and when
thou seest the sun, and the moon, and the stars, even all the host of
heaven, shouldst be driven to worship them . . . 14
According to Yates, this prohibition of graven images, taken from the fourth
chapter of Deuteronomy, was interpreted by Ramus as applying to the classi-
cal art of memory as well. The rhetorical tradition quite actively advocated
the use of lewd and grotesque images by which to excite the imagination
and empower the memory, which to Ramus, was tantamount to a systematic
technique for polluting one’s mind.
14P. Ramus, De religione Christiana, cd. of Frankfort, 1577, pp. 114-15 quoted in Yates,
p. 236.
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It is not too difficult to sympathize with Ramus when considering some
of the writings of his predecessors. Pietro de Ravenna, a 15th century jurist,
ardent self-promoter, and evangelist of the method of places and images wrote
the following as a suggested set of techniques for inventing more effective
mnemonics:
I usually fill my memory-palaces with the images of beautiful women,
which excite my memory . . . and believe me: when I use beautiful
women as memory images, I find it much easier to arrange and repeat
the notions which I have entrusted to those places. You now have a
most useful secret of artificial memory, a secret which I have (through
modesty) long remained silent about: if you wish to remember quickly,
dispose the images of the most beautiful virgins into memory places;
the memory is marvelously excited by images of women. . . This
precept is useless to those who dislike women and they will find it
very difficult to gather the fruits of this art.15
It is worth noting that there is a purely secular counterpart to the Ramist
objection, not on the grounds of spiritual pollution, but rather, conceptual
interference. As I have described, and as an any reader who chooses to exper-
iment with these techniques will see for him or herself, the classical method
of places and images gains its strength by taking advantage of vivid concep-
tual associations, which almost always have very little in common with the
specific facts or ideas that are being remembered. It is necessarily the case
then, that by using these techniques extensively, one is creating a vast array
of associations that are completely arbitrary and have no resemblance to the
logical structure of content being memorized.
In attempting to circumvent these stray associations, whether on religious
or secular grounds, Ramus introduced a concept that will prove to be critical
in understanding the 17th century and the scientific revolution. Ramus was
the first thinker to popularize the word “method.”16 In the modern world,
we understand the connotation of “method” as referring to an orderly, pro-
cedural practice, but in the 16th century when Ramus began to popularize
this word, recall that he was advocating a specific type of method– the di-
alectic method– which stood in contrast to the “mnemonic method,” i.e.,
15Pietro de Ravenna, Phoenix sue artificiosa memoria, quoted in Paolo Rossi, Logic and
the Art of Memory, Chicago 2000, p. 22.
16Yates, p. 369.
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the classical art of memory, and the “method of Ramon Lull,” consisting of
combinatory wheels with associated symbols.
To understand the specific connotation of this word as it would have been
understood by Ramus and his contemporaries, I believe we should examine
the modern word algorithm. The Oxford-English Dictionary defines an algo-
rithm to be,
A procedure or set of rules used in calculation and in problem solving;
a precisely defined set of mathematical or logical operators for the
performance of a particular task.17
I think many would agree that something is lacking in this definition.
Specifically, the word algorithm is a fairly recent word, and yet this defini-
tion describes a notion that has existed for thousands of years. In particular,
Euclid’s algorithm for finding the greatest common divisor of two numbers
dates back as far as 300 BC. What seems to be critically missing from the
definition, is the additional connotation the word algorithm gains when used
in reference to modern computing technology. Certainly, young children can
learn algorithms, say for performing long division, well before they are ex-
posed to computer programming, and teaching them the word algorithm in
this context would add very little to their conceptual maturity. However,
the word itself gains substantial depth with the additional notion that a
computing device can perform a set of instructions thousands, millions, and
billions of times, with a precision and accuracy that no human could other-
wise accomplish. This additional connotation, which is experienced through
interacting with computers, through film and television, and which is not
captured in the purely dictionary definition, is critical, and I believe we can
re-examine the word “method,” as used by Ramus, in a similar light.
While Ramus may have objected to the classical use of images and places,
his own dialectical method– one particular kind of “method”– certainly prof-
ited from the connotation that the art of memory carried with it, namely as
a systematic procedure for the memorization of knowledge. But furthermore,
Ramus’ dialectic method had also something in common with the “method of
Ramon Lull,” as both methods aimed to distill a particular knowledge base,
17Algorithm [Def. 2]. (n.d.). Oxford English Dictionary Online. In Oxford English
Dictionary. Retrieved May 16, 2013, from http://www.oed.com.
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in Lull’s case the Christian doctrine, to its logical essence. Indeed, Lullian
combinatory wheels may have played an essential role in lending a practical
set of associations to the word “method,” in the same way that computing
technology is essential in understanding the word algorithm in modern times.
Recall again, the standard Lullian setup, say for example, consisting of 3
concentric circles with 9 Greek symbols designating the concepts Goodness,
Greatness, Eternity, Power, Wisdom, Will, Virtue and Glory. Lull’s method
for enumerating all
(
9
3
)
= 84 distinct combinations provides a systematic
procedure for ensuring that in the process of contemplating the implications
and interrelation of each concept with each other, no stone would be left
unturned.
We have seen thus far that the notion of “method” unified the diverse
strains of thought related to memory, and that in an important way, the pure
act of memorization was secondary to the notion of method as a systematic
procedure for acquiring knowledge and investigating Nature. Amid these
turbulent conceptual battles being fought on the grounds of the mnemonic,
dialectic, and Lullian methods, with disagreements about the very founda-
tions of method, there were two great mollifiers and unifiers that played a
crucial role in the emergence of the mathematical and scientific methods,
Giordano Bruno and Gottfried Leibniz.
Bruno and Leibniz were both thoroughly versed in all branches of method-
ological thinking, from the classical method of places and images, to the
method of Ramon Lull, to the dialectic method of Ramus. Born four years
after the death of Giulio Camillo, Bruno was trained in a Dominican con-
vent in Naples, where he would have certainly been exposed to the method
of places and images from the ad Herrenium, and to the work of his prede-
cessor, St. Thomas Aquinas. Bruno’s first treatise on memory, De umbris
idearum was published in 1582, and was dedicated to the King of France:
I gained such a name that the King Henri III summoned me one day
and asked me whether the memory which I had and which I taught
was a natural memory or obtained by magic art; I proved to him that
it was not obtained by magic art but by science. After that I printed
a book on memory entitled De umbris idearum which I dedicated to
His Majesty, whereupon he made me an endowed reader.18
18Documenti delta vita di G.B., ed. V. Spampanato, Florence, 1933 pp. 84-85, quoted
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Bruno’s early work had much in common with the tradition of Camillo,
with a significant emphasis on the use of places and images for astrological
purposes. Having been brought up in a world in which Camillo’s influence
would have been strongly felt and talk of his magnificent theater quite ac-
tive, and in addition, belonging to the same Dominican order as St. Thomas
Aquinas, Bruno in a sense was heir to the most significant historical develop-
ments stemming from the classical art of memory. But his historical position
is significantly colored by exposure to that other thread of the art of memory,
the method of Ramon Lull. Indeed, Paris, not far from Bruno’s hometown of
Naples, was the epicenter of 16th century Lullism, and it was in combining
these two traditions that Bruno would make his mark.
Bruno took the bold move of unifying both traditions by starting with
Lullian combinatory wheels, but using classical mnemonic images instead of
the standard alphabet for representing concepts on each locus. Thus, he re-
places the architectural component of the method of places and images by a
Lullian combinatory wheel. Furthermore, in contrast to Ramon Lull, Bruno’s
objectives were not strictly religious in nature. Indeed, he had a great deal
in common with Giulio Camillo, and we can see the extent of this vision in
the shocking size and complexity of Bruno’s wheels. In a particular exam-
ple extracted from one of his treatises, we see detailed a combinatory wheel
with 30 divisions, each of which is further divided into 5 subdivisions, giving
150 divisions in total. The lists that he includes in the book are sets of 150
images each, which are to be ordered on the wheels in a Lullian fashion.19
In the remainder of this essay, I will refer to Bruno’s system as the hybrid
mnemonic-Lullian method.
The complexity of such a system is truly appalling. I invite the reader, if
he or she has not already done so, to attempt the simple exercise I outlined
earlier of visualizing letters arranged in a circle. Having gotten to the point of
visualizing this structure clearly, now attempt to rotate the position of each
letter. If this exercise seems demanding, imagine what kind of mental facility
would be required to manipulate the hundreds of detailed images populat-
ing a Brunian mnemonic wheel! As I stated of Ramon Lull, if Bruno alone
could visualize an object of such stunning complexity, it would have been
in Yates, p. 200.
19Yates pp. 217-223 and Rossi pp. 87-88
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a noteworthy accomplishment, if only for demonstrating the human mind’s
capacity for training unusual cognitive abilities.
It may surprise readers that Gottfried Leibniz, who most know as being
the co-inventor of the infinitesimal calculus, was one of the foremost figures
in methodological innovation. Indeed, his role during the 17th century par-
alleled that of Bruno, and whereas Bruno attempted to unify the Lullian and
mnemonic traditions, Leibniz’ primary effort, indeed what we may reason-
ably describe as his overarching vision, was an effort to unify the mnemonic
method with the dialectic method of Petrus Ramus.20 Certainly Leibniz was
intimately familiar with the Lullian tradition and also of Bruno’s attempts
at unification. The “universal calculus” was Leibniz’ primary aim and it
borrowed from both the dialectical and mnemonic traditions in the following
manner. First, an encyclopedia was to be constructed covering the entire
domain of human thought, from science, to religion, to law. In the spirit
of the dialectic method, the encyclopedia would be carefully assembled so
as to reflect the natural logical structure of each discipline.21 Finally, draw-
ing from the mnemonic method, symbols would be constructed from each
core concept, from which, Leibniz hoped, a universal calculus would emerge
in which logical contradictions could be eliminated from the entirety of hu-
man thought and in which all questions, whether legal, scientific, or religious
could be answered by computing the answer via manipulation of the associ-
20I am diverging from Yates and Rossi in connecting Leibniz with Ramus. Strictly
speaking, Leibniz’ work on the universal calculus should be properly situated, in addition
to its obvious heritage stemming from the art of memory, in the context of the encyclopedic
tradition. But particularly in comparing Leibniz’ efforts to those of Giordano Bruno, I
find it most illustrative to refer to Brunian mnemotechnics as a hybrid mnemonic-Lullian
method and Leibniz’ method as a hybrid mnemonic-dialectic method. I certainly will have
no objection if future scholars think to overturn this distinction– my primary interests in
this article do not rest on this particular choice of nomenclature.
21An example might help to illustrate Leibniz’ views on what a logical structuring of
knowledge entailed. One of the primary intermediate goals Leibniz hoped would ultimately
lead to a universal calculus was to determine all possible subjects of a given predicate, and
conversely, given a subject, to determine all possible predicates. To bridge this encyclope-
dic, or dialectic, objective with the notion of a symbolic calculus, Leibniz proposed that
after fixing a pre-determined ordering of possible predicates, one could associate to each
predicate the corresponding prime number (with respect to the fixed ordering). Then, for
a subject which satisfied some number of predicates, one could uniquely associate a natu-
ral number by taking the product of the corresponding prime numbers. See, for example,
Rossi pp. 178-179.
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ated symbolic infrastructure. As we see in the following passage, it is clear
that Leibniz viewed this project as requiring permanent, ongoing evolution,
progressing hand in hand with the development of scientific knowledge:
Although this language (the universal calculus) depends on true phi-
losophy, it does not depend on its perfection. Let me just say this: this
language can be constructed despite the fact that philosophy is not
perfect. The language will develop as scientific knowledge develops.
While we are waiting, it will be a miraculous aid: to help us under-
stand what we already know, and to describe what we do not know,
and help us to find the means to obtain it, but above all it will help us
to eliminate and extinguish the controversial arguments which depend
on reasons, because once we have realized this language, calculating
and reasoning will be the same thing.22
Leibinz seemed to be keenly aware of the importance of proper nota-
tion,23 and like Ramus, he also seemed to show concern for the potential for
conceptual interference that the mnemonic method necessarily entailed. But
whereas Ramus chose to abandon the notion of symbolic representation en-
tirely, Leibinz continued to express hope that one could find a set of symbols
that would both enable the memory and serve as a proper foundation for
what we might call a “calculus of concepts.” Indeed, Leibniz hoped that by
borrowing geometric elements from the Egyptian alphabet, or pictorial ele-
ments from the Chinese alphabet, he would arrive at a set of symbols which
would precisely satisfy these competing constraints.24
The emergence of the scientific method
We are now in a position to tackle the question I posed at the beginning of
this essay, “what is the scientific method?” As I stated in the introduction,
the standard answer is not entirely inaccurate. As the Oxford English Dic-
tionary states, the scientific method could certainly be defined as “a method
of procedure that has characterized natural science since the 17th century,
22Couturat, Opuscules et fragments ine´dits de Leibniz, pp. 27-28, quoted in Rossi, pp.
174-175.
23Stephen Wolfram discusses Leibniz’ preoccupation with notation in the beautiful es-
say, “Dropping in on Gottfried Leibniz,” http://blog.stephenwolfram.com/2013/05/
dropping-in-on-gottfried-leibniz/
24Rossi pp. 179-180 and Yates p. 381.
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consisting in systematic observation, measurement, and experiment, and the
formulation, testing, and modification of hypotheses.” And Francis Bacon
was certainly among the first to articulate these principles.
What may surprise readers is that Bacon was not only aware of the art of
memory, but also quite well versed in all aspects of methodological thinking.
Indeed, in De augmentis scientiarum, we see a very familiar description of
the method of place and images:
Emblems bring down intellectual to sensible things; for what is sensible
always strikes the memory stronger, and sooner impresses itself than
the intellectual . . . And therefore it is easier to retain the image
of a sportsman hunting the hare, of an apothecary ranging his boxes,
an orator making a speech, a boy repeating verses, or a player acting
his parts, than the corresponding notions of invention, disposition,
elocution, memory, action.25
But as a historical figure, Bacon perhaps most closely resembled Petrus Ra-
mus as an educational theorist, and in The Advancement of Learning, the
art of memory is featured as one of the arts and sciences in need of reform.
In particular, Bacon’s primary objection was that the art of memory could
be used for unnecessarily acquiring massive amounts of information simply
for the purposes of impressing people, and that this kind of effort would be
more usefully directed at advancing the arts and sciences.
Renes Descartes, another central figure in the emergence of the scientific
method, also took on a Baconian interest in reforming the art of memory.
Perhaps coming more prominently from the tradition of natural philosophy
and mathematics, Descartes was interested in using the art of memory for un-
derstanding causality. In this fascinating passage, we see Descartes drawing
a fundamental connection between the mnemonic method and reductionism:
On reading through Schenkel’s26 profitable trifles (in the book De arte
memoria) I thought of an easy way of making myself master of all that
I discovered through the imagination. This would be done through the
reduction of things to their causes. Since all can be reduced to one
it is obviously not necessary to remember all the sciences. When one
25De augmentis scientiarum, V, ed. Spedding, I, p. 649, quoted in Yates, p. 371.
26Schenkel was a 17th century memory theorist.
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understands the causes all vanished images can be easily found again
in the brain through the impression of the cause. This is the true
art of memory and it is plain contrary to (Schenkel’s) nebulous no-
tions. Not that his (art) is without effect, but it occupies the whole
space with too many things and not in the right order. The right
order is that the images should be formed in dependence on one an-
other. He (Schenkel) omits this which is the key to the whole mystery.
I have thought of another way; that out of unconnected images should
be composed new images common to them all, or that one image
should be made which should have reference not only to the one near-
est to it but to them all– so that the fifth should refer to the first
through a spear thrown to the ground, the middle one through a lad-
der on which they descend, the second one through an arrow thrown
at it, and similarly the third should be connected in some way real or
fictitious.27
As has been the common theme throughout this essay, we see that the art
of memory, sagaciously discerned by Simonides, or else discovered by some
other person, has once again captivated the imagination of another great fig-
ure of the Age of Reason. With Bacon and Descartes as my final historical
examples, I hope to have convinced the reader at the very least, that the
classical art of memory and its many descendants played a critical role in
Western intellectual history.28 Let us now return to the origin purpose of
27Descartes, Cogitationes privatae (1619-1621); in Oeuvres, ed. Adam and Tannery, X,
p. 230, quoted in Yates, pp. 373-374.
28As I stated in the introduction, the historical basis for this essay is largely from Frances
Yates’ The Art of Memory and Paolo Rossi’s Logic and the Art of Memory. Therefore, one
primary contribution of this work is to draw attention to a fascinating aspect of scientific
history that is perhaps not well known outside of a few academic circles. Certainly, those
interested in pursuing this line of thought should start with Yates and Rossi’s work, and
also Caruther’s The Memory Book and the references contained therein. So as to interest a
broad audience, and in particular, those in scientific fields, I have condensed a tremendous
amount of history into these few pages and skipped over quite a few important figures along
the way. One could easily devote an entire lifetime to the intellectual history of the art
of memory, and I hope that this essay will stimulate interest in professional and amateur
historians alike. It should be clear to the reader that I have chosen to focus my attention in
this essay entirely on developments that took place in Europe. I do not mean to imply that
significant efforts in the art of memory did not take place elsewhere. Indeed, there is an
incredibly rich tradition of the memory arts in India and it does seem to be of historical
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this essay and re-examine the question “what is the scientific method?”
Most scientists will likely agree with the statement that good scientific
practice largely involves perseverance, determination, curiosity, systematic
thinking, patience, and experience. And I suspect that most will agree that
many of these qualities are the critical determinants of success in other,
non-scientific fields as well. Conversely, bad science can be characterized by
efforts lacking in systematization, lacking in curiosity, impatience, and a lack
of experience. And I think most would agree that these qualities are learned,
as I stated early on in this essay, by simply participating in the frontiers of
research under the guidance of more experienced researchers.
The observation that scientific maturity is largely communicated via im-
plicit, cultural knowledge suggests that the development of the scientific
method was not a discrete event. As I stated in the introduction, we can cer-
tainly point to numerous examples of principled scientific reasoning well be-
fore the 17th century. Indeed it would be difficult to imagine that hypothesis-
driven investigation in some limited form or another was not always part of
human society. To properly re-contextualize the original question, therefore,
it seems more appropriate to ask “how and why did the adoption of the sci-
entific method accelerate during the 17th century?”
There is no doubt that the more commonly attributed elements of the sci-
entific revolution were significant– a vision of the natural sciences built upon
hypothesis-driven investigation, the establishment of a scientific journal, and
the critical support of wealthy patrons, etc. But the question remains as to
why these factors gained traction during this time period when they had not
before. Without a critical mass of scientific accomplishments, these princi-
ples, which seem elementary and self-evident to us, would have been rather
abstract to individuals of that era. What would have been the motivation to
adopt a worldview which amounts to a highly philosophical, meta-scientific
position towards the systematic pursuit of knowledge?
It is specifically in this context, that is, in providing a critical momentum
importance to determine whether in the many scholastic traditions that have emerged
across the world, if there have been developments that paralleled those that unfolded in
Western Europe, particularly with regard to mnemonic techniques and methods involving
symbolic representation, and not simply memorization through repetition.
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and inspiring vision to motivate the widespread adoption of a scientific view-
point that I believe the art of memory to have played an instrumental role. In
particular, the cultural and institutional circumstances of 17th century Eu-
rope provide an answer to the question of how philosophical argumentation
concerning the principles of reason and using rational thought to understand
Nature could have taken root in a world without the academic infrastructure
that we have today. What I believe to have been a critical enabler of scien-
tific thought was that the two medieval schools of memory which would figure
prominently in the 17th century, the classical art as preserved by St. Thomas
Aquinas and the Dominican order, and the method of Ramon Lull preserved
by the Franciscans, would have been well known throughout Europe, given
the geographic flexibility of the friars. Thus, not only would the most re-
cent developments be intelligible to newcomers, for instance Bruno’s hybrid
mnemonic-Lulian method, or Leibniz’ hybrid mnemonic-dialectic method,
but in addition, there was a specific set of techniques that one could put into
practice in order to understand the implications of the larger philosophical
principles and world views being advocated.
Without a concrete set of actions for listeners to engage with, it seems
highly unlikely that the Baconian perspective would have resonated with
a sufficiently large group of people to precipitate institutional or cultural
change. Imagine being a moderately or even highly educated member of 17th
century European society. You attend a lecture by Bacon on the virtues of
reason and the notion that humanity is best served by the most educated
and talented minds directing their efforts toward the natural sciences. Even
if you were inspired by these words, what is the next step? What does one
do next? In a world in which survival itself was a more serious undertaking,
and in a continent torn by political instability, and in which a major plague
took the lives of 15% of the London population, no matter how inspiring the
rhetoric, it seems more likely that a person’s attention would be strongly
pulled back to practical realities.
On the other hand not only did the mnemonic method, the dialectic
method, and the method of Ramon Lull all carry with them analogous rhetor-
ical potency, they slowly began to be directed towards the study of the nat-
ural world and the development of the arts and sciences. In addition, all
of these methods were concrete practices that would have been universally
understood, and which provided an inspiring vision of what could be accom-
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plished with a systematic, rational approach to the pursuit of knowledge. If
one was familiar with the mnemonic method, and was then exposed to Leib-
niz’ notion of the universal calculus, one could, in principle, begin immedi-
ately experimenting with these new ideas, or at the very least contemplate
them and discuss them with others. One could fall asleep at night, slowly
pacing through thousands of memory loci, imagining that rather than being
used for memorizing the words of Cicero, these same loci could be mathemat-
ical symbols which encoded a calculus of the natural sciences. These internal
experiences would have been powerful, and thus, I believe that the true agent
of philosophical change in the 17th century was the notion of “method,” and
in particular, the descendants of the classical art of memory.
If these powerful mental abilities were directed solely at rhetoric, we can
imagine that they would have no bearing on future scientific institutions.
But the historical record indicates otherwise. Indeed, over the course of
nearly two millennia, we see that the art of memory went through multi-
ple transformations and became increasingly directed at general knowledge
and the unearthing of natural principles. And in the eyes of some of the
greatest minds of the Western intellectual tradition, the art of memory was
viewed as something substantially more general and versatile than merely
a tool for memorization. Indeed, nearly three centuries after the invention
of the printing press, we see that the art of memory continued to be in-
vestigated, developed and improved upon, in the diverse incarnations of the
mnemonic method, the dialectic method, the method of Ramon Lull, and the
mnemonic-Lullian method of Giordano Bruno, and the mnemnonic-dialectic
method of Gottfried Leibniz. And not only were those pioneers traditionally
associated with the rise of the scientific method, Francis Bacon and Renes
Descartes, well-versed practitioners of these “other” kinds of method, but
their outlook and vision for the continued development of intellectual insti-
tutions were formulated in reference to the memory arts.
One way to conceptualize the intellectual milieu of this time period is to
recognize that the phrase “scientific method” is in fact a compound construc-
tion consisting of the two words “scientific” and “method.” Just as “organic
chemistry” is a specific kind of chemistry as distinguished from “physical
chemistry” and just as “quantum mechanics” is a specific kind of mechan-
ics as distinguished from “classical mechanics,” the “scientific method” is a
specific kind of method which at one point in time was distinct from other
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kinds of method such as the dialectic method, the method of Ramon Lull,
the mnemonic method, and so on. As I have argued, scientific thinking has
always been part of human society– what took place during the 17th century
was that scientific thinking became fused with methodological thinking. In
other words, it was the art of memory that created the the “method” in
“scientific method.”
In a sense, the principles articulated by Bacon, Descartes, and others,
were something of the aftermath of what should perhaps be called the “method-
ological revolution” rather than the “scientific revolution.” The Baconian
school was in a position to survey the massive intellectual transformation that
was created by the diverse manifestations of the memory arts, and these writ-
ings serve to distill the basic qualities embodied by the widespread practices
of “method,” and to focus these efforts even more strongly in the direction of
the natural sciences. But without the prior history of the mnemonic method
and its many descendants, this perspective may not have had nearly the same
impact.
The art of memory and the growth of the mathematical method
I hope to have convinced the reader of the significant impact the art of mem-
ory has had on Western intellectual history. It is a practice that has been
the foundation of so many institutions and cultural movements, from Greek
and Roman rhetorical students and statesman in antiquity, to the Franciscan
and Dominican friars in the Middle Ages, to the natural philosophers and
scientific trailblazers of the 17th century. For an idea that has so profoundly
sustained and nurtured Western civilization, it made a truly graceful exit.
But perhaps it is an opportune moment in history to reconsider its value,
and in the remainder of this essay, I will examine the role 17th century
discourse played in the growth of mathematical thought. In particular, I will
examine Gottfried Leibniz’ project to construct a universal calculus which
would resolve logical conflict in all areas of knowledge. My primary aim in
this section is to try to understand details of Leibniz’ research agenda in
greater depth, and in particular, to attempt to articulate what to modern
mathematical scientists appears to be a rather peculiar set of beliefs about
mnemonics and their potential for conceptual abstraction. Along the way–
in some sense, attempting to view the world as Leibniz or one of his followers
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would– I will argue the following:
• Mnemonics and mathematics both share the core property of being
symbolic representations of concepts.
• In an era where mathematical thought was substantially less developed,
and in particular, where there were far fewer applications of mathe-
matics to the natural sciences, the difference between mnemonics and
mathematics may have been viewed as being rather small.
• Leibniz, in particular, may have viewed his work on the infinitesimal
calculus as simply a “toy” problem in the much larger vision of the
universal calculus, in which mnemonics would have played a critical role
in creating a symbolic representation of all human knowledge. That is,
mnemonics were viewed as being a potential basis for physical theories,
along side more traditional mathematics.
• Conversely, the motivation to pursue mathematical theories for phys-
ical phenomenon may have gained additional momentum via its af-
filiation with mnemonics, and in particular, the mnemonic theater of
Giulio Camillo, Bruno’s hybrid mnemonic-Lullian method, and Leib-
niz’s hybrid mnemonic-dialectic method. In other words, even though
the mnemonic method ultimately did not give rise to physical mod-
els, there was a widespread vision and tremendous confidence that it
would someday. This vision may have helped to accelerate interest in
pursuing mathematical approaches to model physical phenomena.
• The 17th century vision of mnemonics as being closely related to math-
ematics may provide us with a novel attack on the foundational ques-
tions of “what is mathematics?” or “why can mathematics be used to
model natural phenomena?”
We live in an era where mathematics and the physical sciences have ad-
vanced to such an extent that we are able to make conceptual distinctions
that would seem quite foreign to even the most sophisticated minds of a few
centuries ago. Mathematical researchers categorize analysis, algebra, and
topology as clearly distinct topics from which interdisciplinary work in areas
such as algebraic topology or analytic number theory can arise. Professional
scientists can be heard remarking about the “completely different planets”
occupied by theoretical physics and mathematical physics– distinctions that
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are often difficult to appreciate even to bright undergraduates, let alone a
scientist from several centuries ago when even the most primitive concepts
underlying modern physics were in their nascent stages of formalization.
In the modern era, we have seen so many examples of mathematical suc-
cess, both in the rich conceptual structures of pure mathematics, and in the
application of mathematics to the physical sciences, that we can lose sight
of the fact that there may have been a time when one might have been jus-
tified in maintaining some amount of doubt about the long term viability of
mathematics itself as a worthy topic of investigation. The world today has
been so fundamentally imbued with the successes of mathematics, from the
earth shattering precision of quantum electrodynamics and general relativ-
ity, to the society transforming potential of the Internet, medical imaging,
and autonomous vehicles, that it is easy to forget to ask the question of why
mathematics works at all in describing natural phenomena. And in an earlier
era with far fewer examples of mathematical success in the natural sciences,
what might have been the competing schools of thought that scientific minds
might have otherwise invested their efforts in?
In the essay “On the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the
natural sciences,” physicist and quantum mechanics pioneer, Eugene Wigner,
writes the following:
Most of what will be said on these questions will not be new; it has
probably occurred to most scientists in one form or another. My prin-
cipal aim is to illuminate it from several sides. The first point is
that the enormous usefulness of mathematics in the natural sciences
is something bordering on the mysterious and that there is no ratio-
nal explanation for it. Second, it is just this uncanny usefulness of
mathematical concepts that raises the question of the uniqueness of
our physical theories. In order to establish the first point, that math-
ematics plays an unreasonably important role in physics, it will be
useful to say a few words on the question, “What is mathematics?”,
then, “What is physics?”, then, how mathematics enters physical the-
ories, and last, why the success of mathematics in its role in physics
appears so baffling.29
29Eugene Wigner, “On the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural
sciences,” Communications in Pure and Applied Mathematics, vol. 13, No. I 1960.
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One interesting hypothesis that Wigner suggests is that the success of
mathematics in contemporary science is partly due to a selective bias. That
is, as scientists, we have chosen, somewhat by necessity, to examine a subset
of physical phenomena which are amenable to mathematical description. In
understanding how mathematical thought, and particularly its role in the
physical sciences, could have taken root, it is worth examining the most gen-
eral property of mathematics, namely as a symbolic alphabet for representing
concepts. What I will take as a starting point for the remainder of this dis-
cussion is the observation that the art of memory should also be thought of
as a symbolic alphabet for representing concepts. While this may not have
been the perspective taken during antiquity, it is in the Renaissance trans-
formation of the art of memory and the memory theater of Giulio Camillo
that we see the worldview develop that mnemonic images could be used to
represent the very structure of reality, in other words, as a potential basis for
physical theories. Consequently, I suspect that in an era where the notion
of mathematical modeling and symbolic representation were in their infancy,
the distinction between the memory palaces of the mnemonic method and
mathematics itself may have been viewed as quite small, or rather bearing the
kind of resemblance that a modern mathematician might ascribe to analysis
and algebra, or between a mathematical derivation in a physics paper and a
computer simulation of the same system. That is, these two forms of sym-
bolic systems had enough in common that contrasting them and advocating
the use of one over the other would have been a reasonable thing to do. For
things substantially more dissimilar, it would be completely unnecessary–
one doesn’t need to advocate the use of a broom instead of an apple for
sweeping the floor, but might yell at someone about to use a mop.
I raise this point because I believe it provides us with a novel approach to
attacking the question “what is mathematics?” or “why can mathematics be
used to describe physical phenomena?” Suppose we would like to compare
symbolic systems by the degree to which they possess two different qualities–
the capacity for aiding human memory and the capacity for building up suc-
cessive layers of conceptual abstraction. On such a scale, we would imagine
that the symbols of the mnemonic method have an extremely high degree
of memorability, but low capacity for abstraction, whereas the symbols of
usual mathematics have a high degree of inherent potential for conceptual
abstraction, but a moderately low inherent tendency toward precise recall. It
seems that human natural language lies somewhere in between the mnemonic
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Figure 2: Cartoon diagram showing where different symbolic systems lie with
respect to the criteria of memorability and potential for conceptual abstraction.
The point in the upper-right indicates a hypothetical system combining the high
degree of memorability of mnemonics with the abstract potential of mathematics–
precisely what Leibniz was attempting to achieve with the universal calculus.
method and mathematics on both scales (see Figure 2).
We might then ask what other points on this graph could represent. In
particular, is it possible to develop a symbolic system which has the inher-
ent capacity to aid the human memory, as the mnemonic method does, but
which, like mathematics, also has the potential for building many succes-
sive layers of abstraction? Indeed, I believe that this is exactly the question
that Leibniz was tackling in formulating the notion of the universal calcu-
lus. Recall that the agenda of the universal calculus was to first build an
encyclopedia, in a manner akin to the dialectic method, and to then assign
a symbol for each concept. But Leibniz was keenly aware of the controversy
surrounding the mnemonic method’s problematic side effects for generating
conceptual interference, and was looking to the Chinese and Egyptian alpha-
bets as possible sources of inspiration for how he could retain the memory
aiding features of the mnemonic method, while eliminating the unnecessary
conceptual interference inherent in complicated and fantastic images.
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I find Leibniz’ vision to be truly romantic and beautiful, and yet, I also
have an inherent skepticism that it would have worked. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that in the dialectic tradition, we create a structured list of all biological
knowledge relevant to frogs. As Ramus advises us, we organize the informa-
tion starting with the most general and proceeding towards the most specific.
Now, following Leibniz, we attempt to create a symbolic representation for
each of these concepts (recall the example given earlier of associating pred-
icates with prime numbers). Would we ultimately arrive at a “calculus of
frogs?” This is difficult to imagine, and yet it seems that something along
these lines is what Leibniz was trying to accomplish. It is possible that
enough has been forgotten of the thought process of the era that what I
have written here is a misinterpretation of Leibniz’ agenda. In that case, it
seems like ripe fodder for further historical work to re-examine the primary
sources to understand why Leibinz, a man who had just created one of the
most powerful mathematical structures the world has seen, had tremendous
optimism that the universal calculus based on the hybrid mnemonic-dialectic
method would have given rise to similar levels of conceptual abstraction and
capacity for prediction as the infinitesimal calculus. We see in the following
inspired words, the zeal with which Leibniz pursued this vision:
My invention contains all the functions of reason: it is a judge for
controversies; an interpreter of notions; a scale for weighing probabil-
ities; a compass which guides us through the ocean of experience; an
inventory of things; a table of thoughts; a microscope for scrutinizing
things close at hand; an innocent magic; a non-chimerical cabala; a
writing which everyone can read in his own language; and finally a
language which can be learnt in a few weeks, traveling swiftly across
the world, carrying the true religion with it, wherever it goes.30
Assuming for the moment that Leibniz’ hybrid mnemonic-dialectic method
is unlikely to have given rise to a universal calculus in the way his more math-
ematical work gave rise to the integral and differential calculus, let me now
state a question that I believe to be an alternative approach to attacking
the questions “what is mathematics?” or “why can mathematics be used
30Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, ed. Paul Ritter et al., Sa¨mtliche Schriften und Briefe
herausgegeben von der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Darmstadt, 1923-), I,
ii, pp. 167-169, quoted in Rossi, p. 191.
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to describe natural phenomena?” The question is the following: why does
mathematics keep going where Leibniz’ hybrid mnemonic-dialectic method
stops? That is, it appears as though both mathematics and mnemonics share
the core property of being symbolic representations of concepts, however, the
latent potential in mathematics for building successive layers of abstraction
is infinite, whereas with mnemonics, even when used in conjunction with the
logical structure of a dialectically organized encyclopedia, it seems as though
it doesn’t quite get off the ground. And yet for some of the greatest minds
of the scientific revolution– Gottfried Leibniz in particular, but also Rene
Descartes– there was a tremendous amount of confidence that mnemonics
would give rise to precisely the kind of conceptual power that mathematics
has ultimately given us, and for which there was only a small amount of
evidence at the time.
There is one obvious hypothesis for why mnemonics lack the abstract po-
tential of mathematics, which I think ultimately fails, but is worth examining
anyway. As I have stated throughout this essay, one problematic feature of
mnemonics is the built-in conceptual interference that the techniques give
rise to. In fact, it seems as though conceptual interference is precisely what
enables the powerful ability to recall minutiae with such accuracy. Suppose
I want to remember that the adjective “feline” means “possessing the qual-
ities of a cat.” I can create a mnemonic that uses the sound of the prefix
“fe” to remind me of the element iron, and I can imagine a huge iron cat,
possibly two huge iron cats standing on either side of a large iron gate which
stands at the entrance to a large palace, and in which many cats are stand-
ing in “line” to visit. Using this association, I can remember that “feline”
means “possessing the qualities of a cat.” However, for the most part, the
mnemonic itself consists of information largely irrelevant to anything related
to cats, and so in a fundamental way, this image is incredibly misleading,
although our brains seem to possess the remarkable ability to know to ig-
nore the vast majority of the information contained in the mnemonic image.
I am unlikely to begin to think that cats are able to stand in line or that
there are palaces devoted to cats by virtue of using this particular mnemonic.
So it seems as though mnemonics gain their power by taking advantage
of obscure and fantastic connections between word and object and that while
this may aid the memory, it may also be what inhibits further conceptual
potential. In fact, as I have described earlier in the article, this objection is
34
precisely what was raised by Ramus and his disciples, the proponents of the
dialectic method. Of course, their objection was not entirely an intellectual
one– it was that the use of the mnemonic method would pollute the mind
with unclean images and that this would corrupt one’s spiritual character.
But it seems that for other intellectuals, there would have been completely
secular reasons for opposing use of the mnemonic method, and conceptual
interference was the basis for this objection.
Can we conclude then that the reason that mnemonics do not reach
the conceptual capacity of mathematics is that the information content of
mnemonics is dominated by concepts peripheral to the core notion intended
to be remembered? This is possible, however, it seems worth understand-
ing why such a phase transition would happen, because mathematics itself
does contain some amount of conceptual interference, albeit substantially
less. For example, in quantum mechanics, we frequently denote the system
density matrix with the symbol ρ. The symbol is round– does that mean the
density matrix itself is also round? Of course, not, it is merely a symbol and
could just as well be represented by ψ, Γ, or ⊗. Probability distributions
are often times denoted by pi. Does that mean that they have some deep
connection with the ratio of a circle’s circumference to its diameter? Again,
of course, not, but it is clear from this example that mathematical notation
can also give rise to conceptual interference, albeit substantially less than the
elaborate scenery of the mnemonic method.
Before bringing this discussion to a close, let me restate my primary pur-
pose in this section. For modern intellectuals, Leibniz’ agenda of constructing
the universal calculus via the mnemonic-dialectic method sounds extremely
strange. How could mnemonic images possibly give rise to either conceptual
abstraction or predictive power when they are simply one-to-one maps from
some list of facts? And yet it appears as though this viewpoint had quite a
bit of support during the 17th century. In particular, it is noteworthy that
Leibniz, who stands among elite company in having developed the infinitesi-
mal calculus, had the most confidence of any thinker of the era– it would be
surprising if the obvious objections to this project were lost on him. There-
fore, I believe that the question “why does mathematics have a near infinite
capacity for conceptual abstraction whereas mnemonics do not?” is a new
one and may provide a fresh perspective on how to attack some long-standing
questions in the foundations of mathematics. Perhaps in trying to articulate
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explicitly the many implicit assumptions in our worldview, we will discover
something novel and of practical relevance to contemporary intellectual ques-
tions.
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